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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
I MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Date: September 17, 2007 
Case No. 070102050 
Division XI: Judge David N. Mortensen 
This matter comes before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment. The 
motion has been fully briefed by both parties. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's 
motion is granted. 
^DISPUTED FACTS 
The following undisputed material facts are based on the plaintiffs response to facts 
alleged by defendants' in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, facts which were not controverted by 
the plaintiff are deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment.1 
^nder Rule 7, facts not controverted are deemed admitted. Where a fact is purportedly 
controverted, but the non-moving party either fails to properly controvert the fact under Rule 7 
(by providing ground disputing the fact with particularity and supporting the dispute by citation 
to relevant materials) or fails to controvert the fact in a "genuine" way, a trial court may likewise 
consider the asserted fact admitted. 
In this case, the court could deem all of defendant's facts admitted by plaintiffs 
wholesale failure to follow Rule 7(c)(3)(B): "A memorandum opposing a motion for summary 
judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
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1. On July 7, 2004, plaintiff joined Gold's Gym. 
2. As a condition of membership, plaintiff was required to sign a contract ("Contract") 
that included the Assumption of Risk and Risk of Accident clause ("Release"). 
3. JPiaintiff read, signed, and agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions of the 
Release. 
4. The Release executed by the plaintiff includes the following language: 
...ANY PERSON USING THE EQUIPMENT OR THE FACILITIES DOES SO AT 
THEIR OWN RISK...and the Gym shall not be liable to Buyer or Member for any claims, 
demands, injuries, damages, or actions arising due to injury to Buyer or Member, their 
person, or property arising out of or in connection with the use by Buyer or Member of 
the services and facilities or the premises where the same is located and Buyer or Membei 
hereby holds the Gym, its employees and agents harmless from all claims which may be 
brought against them by Buyer or Member or on either of their behalf for such injuries of 
claims aforesaid. 
5. On July 12, 2004, plaintiff tripped and fell in the parking lot at Gold's Gym at about 
9:30 p.m. and injured her knee. 
6. Plaintiff's son S. Andrew Johnson, daughter Jocelyn Vance, and son-in-law Justin 
Vance^yere present in the Gold's Gym parking lot when plaintiff fell. 
7. /Prior to being informed by plaintiff of her injury and the defect in the parking lot that 
causea n, aefendants had never observed or nt-en made aware of any dangerous condition, either 
cracks or holes, existing within the asphalt parking lot. 
8./rrior to plaintiffs fall, there had been no reports of any accidents or falls in the 
controverted[.]" Further, additional facts to be considered must be separately stated and 
numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials. The court specifically holds that as to 
the facts hereinafter stated, plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue. 
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parking lot caused by cracks, holes, or broken asphalt at a time when there were more than 1,000 
visitors per day at Gold's Gym. 
9. During her visit to the gym only the day before her fall, plaintiff did not observe any 
problems with the asphalt or trip hazards. 
10. Plaintiff did not see the crack in the asphalt before she fell 
11. jPlaintiff has not provided any evidence that defendants4iad notice,of any dangerous 
condition existing in the parking lot prior to plaintiffs fall. 
DISPUTED FACTS THAT ARE NOT MATERIAL 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the standard for summary 
judgment and states that summary judgment "shall be rendered if..there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In 
determining whether summary judgment is proper, the court views thefacts in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted because (1) plaintiff released 
defendant Gold's Gym from liability when she signed the Contract upon becoming a member of 
the gym, and (2) plaintiff failed to show that defendants had actual or constructive notice of the 
defect in the asphalt that caused her to fall. The court discusses each of these reasons in turn. 
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I PLAINTIFF RELEASED DEFENDANT GOLD'S GYM FROM LIABILITY 
WHEN SHE SIGNED THE RELEASE INCLUDED IN THE CONTRACT UPON 
BECOMING A MEMBER OF THE GYM. 
Although Utah case law strirth, —--^-ues contract clauses that attempt to limit one's 
liability, courts will enforce such terms if "the preclusion against negligence is clearly and 
unequivocally stated." Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 341 P.2d 944 (Utah 
1959). While the release of liability must be clearly and unequivocally stated, the rule of strict 
construction does not require a specific reference to one party's negligence. See Freund v. Utah 
Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 371 (Utah 1990) (holding that an agreement that did not 
specifically mention the effect of one party's negligence was nevertheless effective to release the 
party from potential negligence because of the "broad sweep of the language."). Indeed, the Utah 
Court of Appeals noted almost twenty years ago that "the contemporary judicial trend is tcT limit 
the application of the strict construction rule[]" and that "the law of Utah should develop 
consistent with this trend." Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp., Ill P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 
CtApp. 1989). 
A. The Release in the Contract expresses a clear and unequivocal intent 
by the parties that the plaintiff would release Gold's Gym from any 
liability arising from the use of the equipment, the facilities, or the 
premises of the gym. 
As noted above, if a clause purporting to release one party from liability is clear and 
unequivocal in its terms, a court will enforce the clause. In Russ v. Woodside Homes, 905 P.2d 
901, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted this requirement in the 
context of a release clause in which the plaintiff agreed to hold defendant "harmless for 'any and 
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all claims, damages, loss and expenses'" and "for 'any death, accident, injury, or other 
occurrence resulting from/Visits to [defendant's! JOD sue. j The court cited to Freund for the 
principle that although the provision did not explicitly mention negligence of the defendant, "the 
word 'negligence5 is not a talisman to enforce contracts avoiding potential liability." Id. at 905 
(citing Freund, 793 P.2d at 370). The court stated, "A hold harmless provision is enforceable 
when 'the broad sweep of the language employed by the parties clearly covers those instances in 
which a party may be negligent'" Id. (citing Freund, 793 P.2d at 371). The court found that the 
provision clearly expressed the parties' intent to avoidjfae defendant's potential liability for 
negligence and that it therefore was enforceable and barred the plaintiffs negligence claim 
against the defendant. Id. at 906. 
The language from the Contract signed by plaintiff is very similar to the provision at issue 
in the Woodside Homes case. It states that "the Gym shall not be liable to Buyer or Member for 
any claims, demands, injuries, damages, or actions arising due to injury to Buyer or Member...." 
Although this does not explicitly mention negligence on the part of Gold's Gym, the language is 
clearly broad enough to include those instances in which Gold's Gym may be negligent. The 
language clearly and unequivocally expresses an intent by the parties that plaintiff will hold 
defendant Gold's Gym harmless "from all claims[,]^ including claims alleging negligence on the 
part of defendant Gold's Gym. 
B. The plaintiffs injury, which was allegedly caused by a defect in the 
asphalt in the Gold's Gym parking lot, is covered by the terms of the 
Release. 
It is a well-accepted tenet of contract law that "[i]f the language within the four corners 
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of the contract is unambiguous, the £arties['] intentions are determined from the plain meaning 
of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Central 
Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, [^12, 40 P.3d 599 (citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "[a]n ambiguity exists where the language 'is 
reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense.'" Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 
UT 89,1fl3, 987 P.2d 48 (citation omitted). This court holds as a matter of law that the terms of 
the Release are unambiguous, and that the term "premises" includes the parking lot in which the 
plaintiff was injured. 
One definition of "premises" in Webster }s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary is "a 
building together with its grounds or other appurtenances." This is the plain meaning of the wordf 
"premises" in everyday usage. Additionally, when taken in context, the use of the word 
"premises" in the phrase "the use...of the services and facilities or the premises where the same is 
located[,]" is not reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense or in a different 
sense from the definition given above. Contrary to plaintiffs argument, the parking lot is clearly 
covered by the terms of the release, and her claim based on her injury in the parking lot is within 
the ambit of the release. Therefore, plaintiffs negligence claim is barred as to defendant Gold's 
Gym. 
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IL THE DEFECT COMPLAINED OF BY PLAINTIFF WAS TEMPORARY IN 
NATURE, SO HER FAILURE TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANTS HAD PRIOR 
NOTICE OF THE UNSAFE CONDITION IS FATAL TO HER CASE. 
The court holds that the defect complained of by the plaintiff was temporary in nature, so 
a failure to establish actual or constructive notice to the defendants and sufficient time to remedy 
the condition is therefore fatal to her case. 
In premises liability cases, Utah case law creates two classes of unsafe conditions: those 
that are temporary, and those that are of a permanent nature. Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. 
Co., 2004 UT 80, f 19, 104 P.3d 1185. Where unsafe conditions are temporary, a business owner 
must have actual or constructive knowledge of the conditions and sufficient time after receiving 
such knowledge to remedy the situation. Id. In contrast, where the unsafe condition is 
permanent-which is defined as a condition which was chosen or created by the business owner or 
for which he is responsible-the business owner is deemed to have knowledge of the condition. 
Id. Plaintiff maintains that this case falls into the second category where an unsafe condition is 
permanent and therefore notice of the condition is assumed. Plaintiff's memorandum in 
opposition at 11. This court disagrees. 
A. The defect in the asphalt was temporary. 
The Utah Supreme Court first articulated the difference between temporary and 
permanent unsafe conditions in premises liability cases m Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, 538 
P.2d 175 (Utah 1975). The court stated that the first class of cases "involves some unsafe 
condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery substance on the floor and usually where it is 
not known how it got there." Id. at 176 (emphasis included). In contrast the second class of 
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cases described by the court "involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such as: in 
the structure of a building, or of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or its manner of 
use, which was created or chosen by the defendants (or his agents), or for which he is 
responsible." Id. (emphasis included). 
In Goebel, the plaintiffs injury was allegedly caused by a gap between rubber mats that 
adjoined the road to a railroad crossing. 2004 UT 80, at ^ 6. The plaintiffs argued that the gap 
was a permanent unsafe condition of which the defendant railway company was deemed to have 
knowledge. Id. at ^19. However, the Utah Supreme Court held that the gap was not a permanent 
unsafe condition because "the defendant did not create the unsafe condition, and [was] 
'responsible' for it only in the context of maintenance, not for its existence in the first place." Id. 
at Tf20. The court found that because "the proximate cause of Mr. Goebel5 s injury was the 
breakdown or mechanical degradation of something that was not alleged to have been negligently 
created or installed[,]" the gap was therefore a temporary unsafe condition of which the 
defendant must have had notice in order to be held liable. Id. at ^[21. 
Although plaintiff argues that the defect in the asphalt was permanent and therefore 
required no notice, the court finds that the defect was temporary in nature. It is clear that the 
alleged defect was not chosen or created by the defendants, and plaintiff does not argue that the 
parking lot was "negligently created or installed." Nor were the defendants responsible for the 
crack or hole in the asphalt beyond a responsibility "in the context of maintenance, not for its 
existence in the first place." Similar to the Goebel case, the defect that was alleged to have 
caused plaintiffs injuries was created by the "breakdown or mechanical degradation" of the 
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asphalt. This court therefore holds that the defect in the asphalt was an unsafe condition that was 
temporary in nature.2 
B. There is no evidence that defendants had actual or constructive notice 
of the defect-
When an unsafe condition is temporary in nature, courts require "evidence that the 
defendant had some kind of notice of the dangerous condition, together with evidence that the 
defendant had that notice for a time sufficient for it to repair that condition." Id at ^21. In fact, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that "evidence of notice and a reasonable time to remedy are 
requiredto survive a motion for summary judgment or directed verdict." Id. at [^22 (emphasis 
added). In explaining the rationale for different notice requirements based on the nature of the 
unsafe condition, the court stated, "[I]t is reasonable to presume that a party has notice of 
conditions that the party itself creates, but it is not reasonable to presume notice of conditions 
that someone else creates..., that arise from malfunctions..., or that gradually evolve on their 
own." Id. 
In Goebel, the plaintiffs had no evidence that the defendant had actual notice, so they 
argued that the defendant had constructive notice based on its failure to perform reasonable 
inspections. Id. at f23. However, the court rejected this argument because the plaintiff and the 
plaintiffs5 expert both failed to notice the gap themselves. Id. In addition, the plaintiffs argued 
that the gap must have evolved gradually over time, so the defendant would have noticed the gap 
2This conclusion is butressed by plaintiffs opposition which notes, with attached 
photographs, the "repair" of the condition after the event. 
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if it had been paying attention and therefore would have had a reasonable time to repair it. Id. at 
[^24. The court likewise rejected this argument because the plaintiffs had introduced no evidence 
that the gap had evolved gradually as opposed to being formed suddenly. Id. at P25. The court 
also stated that even if the gap had existed for a long period of time, there was no reason to 
believe that the defendant should have noticed it since there was no evidence that the defendant 
did not reasonably inspect the railroad crossing. Id. The court found that because the plaintiffs 
had offered no evidence that the defendant knew of the gap or the length of time for which the 
defendant had such notice, their "mere hypothesis that the gap may have existed for some 
unknown length of time does not suffice." Id. 
The court's analysis in Goebel is controlling in this case. 
If a plaintiff alleges that the defendant negligently failed to remedy a dangerous condition that the 
defendant did not create (as in Schnuphase), negligently failed to repair a dangerous malfunction 
in an otherwise safe system (as in Fishbaugh), or negligently allowed an otherwise safe condition 
to degrade over time into a dangerous condition (as in the instant case), then evidence of notice 
and a reasonable time to remedy are required to survive a motion for summary judgment[.] 
Goebel, 2004 UT 80, Tf 22, 104 P.3d 1185. As in Goebel, the plaintiff has produced no evidence 
that defendants had actual notice of the defect in the asphalt. And while plaintiff has implied that 
defendants did not conduct reasonable inspections of the parking lot, plaintiff has produced no 
evidence to that effect. Plaintiff has also failed to produce evidence of the length of time the 
defect in the asphalt existed. Because plaintiff has failed to introduce evidence that defendants 
did not reasonably inspect the parking lot, that defendants knew of the defect, or the length of 
time for which the defendants had notice, the plaintiff cannot recover on her claim as a matter of 
law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above facts and analysis, defendant's motion for summary judgment is 
hereby granted. Counsel for defendants is instructed to prepare appropriate order consistent with 
this ruling and adopting this memorandum decision by reference. 
Dated this of September, 2007. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUL 2 200? 
«B» 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Date: July 2,2007 
Case No. 070102050 
Division XI: Judge David N. Mortensen 
This matter comes before the court on the following motions: 
1. The Defendant's motion for summary judgment filed on April 6, 2007. 
2. Defendant's motion filed on April 27, 2007, to strike Plaintiffs designation of 
expert witnesses. 
3. Defendant's motion to compel discovery filed on April 30, 2007. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On April 13, 2005, Nelda P. Johnson ("Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Gold's Gym 
and Peay Investment Company ("Defendants"), which the Defendants then filed answers to. In 
her complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that she fell in the parking lot at Gold's Gym and injured her 
knee. 
The parties filed an attorney's Rule 26(f) planning meeting report and stipulated 
scheduling order wherein the parties agreed that the deadline for conducting fact discovery would 
be November 15, 2006. The deadline for identification of the Plaintiffs expert witnesses and 
production of their expert witness reports would be December 15, 2006, which is 30 days from 
the completion of fact discovery. The deadline for identification of Defendant's rebuttal expert 
witnesses and production of reports was set at January 15, 2007, which is 60 days after the 
Plaintiffs disclosure of expert witnesses and production of expert reports. In the first week of 
December 2006, the Defendants agreed to the Plaintiffs request to extend fact discovery until 
January 30, 2007. On March 2,2007, Plaintiff filed her designation of expert witnesses, but then 
negotiated another extension of time for providing her expert's reports. 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on April 6, 2007. On April 24, 2007, 
Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to respond to Defendants' summary judgment 
motion.1 Defendants also filed a motion to strike the Plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses, 
a motion to compel discovery, and a memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiffs motion for 
extension of time. Plaintiff filed no other response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to strike the expert 
designation. 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
1. Defendants' Request for Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." U.R.C.P. 56(c). Additionally, 'the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . ." Jackson v. 
1
 No request to submit for decision has been filed regarding Plaintiffs motion for a 45 day extension of 
time. Plaintiff also has filed a motion to compel to which defendant has responded. No request to submit 
for decision has been filed regarding this motion either. 
Mateus, 70 P. 3d 78, 80 (Utah 2003) (internal citations omitted). Summary Judgment "denies the 
opportunity of trial [and so] should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is no 
reasonable probability the party moved against could prevail. Utah State University of 
Agriculture and Applied Sciences v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982). 
As opposed to addressing the merits of the motion, plaintiff has sought only an extension 
of time. Giving the plaintiff every benefit of the doubt, particularly believing that plaintiffs 
counsel did not receive the motion and memorandum until two days before the memorandum in 
opposition was due, this Court grants an extension but not that sought by the plaintiff. Plaintiff 
sought an extension of 45 days, although her own memorandum indicated that the pertinent 
affidavits could be obtained in a matter of days, not weeks. Further, by now a period of 45 days 
has expired. 
Like the defendant, this Court is construing defendant's motion for extension of time as a 
rule 56 (f) affidavit. There is no explanation within plaintiffs motion for extension of time as to 
why discovery could not have been obtained earlier. Nor is there any real explanation as to why 
the affidavits could not be obtained in a faster manner. The motion for extension of time is 
completely silent as to any specific allegation of evidence sought to be discovered. The court 
further notes that extensions of time for discovery have previously been granted. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for extension is hereby granted only for the purposes of 
responding to the merits of the motion and obtaining the two affidavits identified. This Court 
considers discovery closed, unless stipulated to by the parties. Plaintiff shall have until July 9, 
2007 to file any and all responses to the motion for summary judgment. 
2. Defendants' Request to Strike Plaintiffs Designation of Expert Witnesses 
Defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses is granted in part 
and denied in part. As to any treating physician for whom records have previously been received 
by defendants, such records may be considered reports for the purposes of rule 26.2 However, at 
trial where no further report has been produced, the witness will be limited to those subjects 
identified and supported in the medical records. Again, giving the plaintiff every benefit of the 
doubt, any complete expert disclosures made prior to February 28th, 2007, 30 days after the end of 
fact discovery shall be considered timely. It appears from the record that defendants gave an 
extension to plaintiff to supply expert reports until March 18, 2007. While plaintiff did not meet 
this exact date, it appears that the information concerning Dr. Wyman, including a fiill report and 
previous testimony disclosures, has been made. As a result, defendant's motion as to Dr. Wyman 
is hereby denied. 
Plaintiff concedes that "Clay" and Leslie Thorton shall not be called as experts. 
Accordingly, defendants motion as to "Clay" and Leslie Thorton is hereby granted. 
Plaintiff asserts that plaintiffs expert designation filed March 2, 2007 complies with rule 
26. Rule 26 (a)(3)(B) provides: 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure shall, 
with respect to a witness who is retained were specially employed to provide expert 
testimony in the case were whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve 
giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the 
witness or party. 
As plaintiff points out, this report may be signed by the witness or the party (or the party's 
attorney on behalf of the party). However, it appears plaintiff has failed to consider the 
This seems to comport with rule 26(a)(3)(B)'s language requiring reports of a witness who "is retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony in the case . . ." since often treating physicians are employed firstly as a 
healer and only secondarily as a witness, the reporting requirement of this rule arguably does not apply. However, 
once a party seeks to introduce testimony which aids litigation but was not needed for the purposes of treatment, it 
would appear that the party has placed that witness within the purview of the rule. 
remainder of the rule which provides: 
The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the 
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary 
of the grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all 
publications authored by the witness within the preceding 10 years; the compensation to 
be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witnesses testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
The disclosures of the plaintiff barely contain the subject matter on which the experts are to 
testify, with the exception of Dr. Wyman. As to all of the other experts, no summary of the 
grounds is given for each opinion. The substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is 
expected to testify are absent as well. This Court could perceive no facts stated in plaintiffs 
disclosure. The qualifications of the witnesses is wholly absent. No indication is made as to any 
publications, if they exist, authored by any witness. The compensation to be paid to the witness, 
easily ascertainable, is absent. With the exception of Dr. Wyman, no list has been given of any 
other cases in which the witnesses testified at trial or deposition within the preceding four years. 
In sum, the disclosures are deficient and would not allow a party to assess the need to conduct 
discovery connected with the expert testimony, and assuredly would not assist any party in 
preparing for trial. Ultimately, the purposes of rule 26 have been circumvented. Both as to 
initial disclosures, other disclosures, and expert disclosures, the purpose of the rules was to 
encourage the free flow of information, not a hide matters until trial. David Jenkins is hereby 
stricken as an expert for the plaintiff. 
Accordingly, defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part consistent with the 
above. 
3. Defendants' Motion to Compel Discovery 
Defendants' motion to compel discovery remains unopposed by plaintiff. Further, the 
motion provides a sufficient basis for relief. Accordingly, defendants motion to compel is hereby 
granted, along with attorney's fees and costs for bringing the motion as requested. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above facts and analysis, the ruling of the court is as follows: 
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied, until such time as plaintiff responds, or 
July 9, 2007, whichever is earlier. Thereupon, defendant may submit issue for decision again. 
2. Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs designation of expert witnesses is granted in part and 
denied in part. 
3. Defendant's motion to compel is granted. 
Counsel for Defendants is instructed to prepare an appropriate order consistent with this 
ruling and submit it to the court consistent with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 1/ day of July, 
N. Mortensen 
idicial District Court 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 070102050 by the method and on the date 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
1 RULING ON MOTIONS TO 
RECONSIDER, STRIKE, AND COMPEL 
Date: November 29, 2007 
Case No. 070102050 
Division XI: Judge David N. Mortensen 
This matter comes before the court on plaintiffs motion to reconsider, plaintiffs motion 
to compel, and defendant's motion to strike photographs. For the reasons which follow 
plaintiffs motions to reconsider and compel are denied and defendant's motion to strike 
photographs is granted. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This action was commenced when plaintiff filed a complaint on April 13, 2005. The 
parties entered into a stipulated scheduling order whereby fact discovery would end November 
15, 2006 and expert discovery would follow. The parties agreed to an extension of fact discovery 
until January 30, 2007. After all of the dates had expired, the defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment on Aoril 6. 2007. In response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff 
did not file any substantive response, but instead filed a motion for extension of time to respond 
to defendants' motion. No affidavit was submitted pursuant to rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. In fact, plaintiff never submitted for decision her motion for a 45 day extension 
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of time to respond to the motion for summary judgment. In addition to failing to submit her 
motion, no response to the motion for summary judgment was filed within the 45 days initially 
requested. Nevertheless, giving plaintiffs counsel every benefit, this court construed the motion 
for extension of time as a rule 56(f) affidavit. This court allowed plaintiff to file a response even 
though the motion for extension of time gave no explanation as to why discovery could not have 
been obtained earlier, nor did it contain any explanation as to why opposing affidavits could not 
be obtained in a more expeditious manner, and the motion was completely silent as to any 
specific allegation of evidence sought to be discovered. 
Plaintiff did file a response to motion for summary judgment on July 2, 2007. Plaintiff 
did not request oral argument on the motion for summary judgment. On September 17, 2007 this 
court issued a memorandum decision granting defendants summary judgment. An order 
reflecting the memorandum decision was executed by this judge on October 17, 2007. 
Apparently that same day plaintiffs counsel faxed a letter to the court asking the court to rule on 
the motion to reconsider before executing the order. However, the order had already been 
executed. 
On October 10, 2007, plaintiff filed a "motion for reconsideration of order granting 
summary judgment," along with a memorandum in support of this motion. The motion does not 
assert that it is being brought pursuant to any rule under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
motion maintains that this court should reconsider its decision regarding summary judgment 
arguing that: (1) this court wrongly concluded that plaintiff had released defendant Gold's gym 
when she signed the membership agreement, (2) plaintiffs claimed did not arise from a temporary 
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condition and therefore notice of the condition was not required, (3) that the issue of constructive 
notice is a fact issue for the jury, and finally (4) that this court is the improper venue for this 
cause of action. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE 
Plaintiff has brought a motion to reconsider, a motion not enumerated by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. This court concludes that when a trial court issues a decision which disposes,, 
of all claims in a matter a party is precluded from revisiting the case by wav of a "motion to 
reconsider." Accordingly, plaintiffs motion is denied. 
For many years the appellate courts have been discouraging motions to reconsider. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44 If 18 n. 5 stated: 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize motions to reconsider. 
Although we have discouraged these motions, see Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & 
Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1063-65 (Utah 1991), they have proliferated in civil actions 
to the extent that they have become the cheatgrass of the litigation landscape. We 
acknowledge that the extraordinary circumstance may arise when it is appropriate 
to request a trial court to reconsider a ruling. These occasions are rare, however, 
and we encourage attorneys to reverse the trend to make such motions to 
reconsider routine. 
Having ascertained that repeated suggestions had fallen on generally deaf ears, the court in Gillett 
v. Price, 2006 UT 24 cut down a wide swath of the motion to reconsider cheatgrass by holding 
that "regardless of the motion's substance, post-iudpment ™~+;™o +^  r e c o n s i ( i e r an (j 0ther 
similarly titled motions will not toll the time for appeal because they are not recognized by our 
rules." The court noted, however, that "this holding applies to post-final-judgment motions to 
reconsider; it does not affect motions to or decisions by the district courts to reconsider or revise 
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nonfinal judgments, which have no impact on the time to anneal and are sanctioned by our 
rules." The issue in Gillett was whether the Utah Court of Appeals had properly held that 
plaintiffs notice of appeal was not timely. Thus the holding of the Supreme Court of Utah in 
Gillett addressed a motion to reconsider and its ability to toll the time for appeal. Accordingly, 
the holding of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Gillett does not truly address motions to 
reconsider brought before a final judgment is entered. That is the circumstance ncie. 
The remaining cheatgrass, but for a few select stalks, should be hewn down. This court 
does not believe that all motions to reconsider are in fact sanctioned by the rules when placed 
before the trial court pre-final-judgment. In noting the fact that the rules sanction, arguably, a 
motion to reconsider, the Utah Supreme Court in Gillett referenced rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. However, a close reading of the rule shows the sanction of motions to 
reconsider, otherwise known as revision of prior decisions, to be limited. 
Rule 54(b) provides: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the 
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon express direction for the entry 
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or 
other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate 
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any time before entry of judgment adjudicating 
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(emphasis added). Thus, the rule contemplates that other forms of decision, such as a 
memorandum decision, are subject to revision only when remaining claims or rights and 
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liabilities have not been adjudicated. However, in cases such as/he present one where the grant 
of summary judgment disposes of all claims, there is ita-good reason that motions to reconsider 
should be recognized under this rule. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly rules 52 
and 59, provide sufficient avenues of redress for the extraordinary circumstance alluded to in 
Shipman. 
For example, it may occur that, between the grant of summary judgment and the signing 
of the final order, precedent is established by an appellate court which brings into question the 
validity of a trial court's ruling. Likewise, it may occur that counsel ascertains after a ruling, but 
before a judgment is entered, that both parties failed to cite controlling and determinative 
precedent which likely should change the outcome of the decision. In either event, under rule 59 
a party could make a motion for a new trial claiming an error in law. See rule 59(a)(7); 
Crestwood Cove Apts. Bus. Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, f40.(trial court can grant new trial 
where "prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice").1 Also, 
should new evidence be found which could not have been, with reasonable diligence, discovered 
prior to the ruling on the motion, a motion for a new trial is a proper remedy. See rule 59(a)(4). 
Utah's appellate courts have already held that a motion for a new trial following summary 
judgment is procedurally correct and available to litigants. Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 
797 P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1990). With this remedy readily available, no reason exists to 
1
 In fact, in the past courts have construed motions to reconsider as motions for a new 
trial. Davis v. Grand County Serv. Area, 905 P.2d 888 (Utah App. 1995). 
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perpetuate motions to reconsider in cases that have been fully adjudicated on motion.2 
Further, the Gillett court's dicta concerning motions reconsider pre-final-judgment fails to 
address the holding in Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966). In Drury, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that once a trial court had granted a motion for a new trial, and where 
no inadvertence, mistake, or irregularity appeared in connection with obtaining the order, the trial 
court had no authority to entertain and grant a motion to reconsider or review its own ruling.3 
The Utah Supreme Court's reasoning in Gillette provides further arguments to disallow 
pre-fmal-judgment motions to reconsider as well. First, the court restated: 
In fact, post-judgment motions to reconsider are not recognized anywhere in either the 
Utah rules of appellate procedure or the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Gillette, 2006 UT 24 f 6. In point of fact, motions to reconsider per se are not found in the rules 
at all. The court then went on to state: 
2The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide other avenues of redress to provide a trial 
court ample opportunity to correctly address an issue. Rules 59(e) and 52(b) both allow a court 
to alter or amend a judgment, amend findings, and alter a judgment consistent with the changed 
findings. While rulings on summary judgement do not entail findings per se, a court must 
determine, or find, that no genuine issue of dispute remains. 
3
 The Drury court noted: 
If the party ruled against were permitted to go beyond the rules, make a motion for 
reconsideration, and persuade the judge to reverse himself, the question arises, why 
should not the other party who is now ruled against be permitted to make a motion for re-
reconsideration, asking the court to again reversed himself? Tenacious litigants and 
lawyers might persist in motions, arguments and pressures and theoretically a judge could 
go on reversing himself periodically at the entreaties of one or the other of the parties ad 
infinitum. 
Drury, 415 P.2d at 663. 
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We are now persuaded that it is time this practice comes to an end. In our system, the 
rules provide the source of available relief. They "[are] designed to provide a pattern or 
regularity of procedure which the parties and the courts [can] follow and rely upon." 
Id at % citing Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966). Specifically 
recognizing the onerous burden placed upon trial courts by vaguely labeled motions, the Gillett 
court concluded: 
Hereafter, when a party seeks relief from a judgment, it must turn to the rules to 
determine whether relief exists, and if so, direct the court to the specific relief available. 
Parties can no longer leave this task to the court by filing so-called motions to reconsider 
and relying upon district courts to construe the motions within the rules. 
Id. Unless the holding of Gillett is extended to nre-fmal-iudgment ruling which adjudicate all 
claims as well, the burden upon the trial courts will remain. As shown here, there exists no 
reason to limit this analysis to post final judgment scenarios. 
The reasons for implementing a rule disallowing motions to reconsider when a ruling has 
completely disposed of a case are highlighted by plaintiffs motion to reconsider in this case. For 
the most part plaintiff is simply re-arguing her case. To some extent plaintiff is attempting to 
supplement the record, perhaps hoping that the appellate court will not be able to make a 
distinction between the record before the trial court at the time summary judgment was granted 
and evidence or arguments presented subsequent to the memorandum decision.4 It does not 
advance the interests of justice or the efficiency of the courts to essentially allow parties to re-
argue or re-present matters to the court when significant time has already j>een expended in a 
memorandum decision. 
4
 An appeal in this matter has already been filed. 
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This concern is even more egregious in this case where the plaintiff party had an 
exceptionally long extension in which to respond to the motion for summary judgment. The 
entirety of the discovery period in the case had already concluded. Knowing that a grant of 
summary judgment was possible, this court would assume that all evidence within plaintiffs 
possession or control would have already been brought before the court. Additionally, even if 
information has been presented in the motion to reconsider which was not presented before the 
court made its memorandum decision in September of this year, at a minimum a party should 
have to show that somehow evidence was not reasonablv attainable prior to the court's decision 
before the court should consider it in any way. Plaintiffs memorandum is silent on this issue, 
except for the allegation that certain pictures taken long after the event, and arguably irrelevant 
for determination of this case, were for ambiguous reasons unavailable.5 
For these reasons, plaintiffs motion to reconsider is hereby denied. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER LACKS MERIT 
Even if the court were to consider the motion on the merits, the motion should be denied. 
Re-argument and assertion of new facts. Plaintiff provides nothing new in the motion 
to reconsider concerning this court's ruling that the release signed by the plaintiff relieved Gold's 
Gym of liability in this matter. Plaintiffs simply re-argues her case. The arguments were not 
5
 For example, while in opposition to a motion to strike plaintiff argues that defendants 
should have subpoenaed the photographs, plaintiff fails to recognize that this same argument 
obliterates any reasonable argument for reconsideration based upon the photographs. Could not 
plaintiff have subpoenaed the pictures herself, thus having them in her possession in a timely 
manner to oppose a summary judgment motion? 
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persuasive before, and they are not persuasive now. 
In her original opposition to the motion for summary judgment plaintiff claimed: 
Plaintiffs injury arose from the second class of a dangerous condition. 
This second class of premises liability arises where the defendant is responsible for the 
condition, he is deemed to know the condition and no proof of notice is necessary, [sic] 
Plaintiff continues to pursue this theory in the motion to reconsider; that is, that the cause of the 
fall was not a temporary condition. This court simply disagrees with plaintiffs contention, 
although the court notes that in plaintiffs motion to reconsider she attaches her own declaration, 
where in paragraph 7 she refers to the place of her fall as "broken asphalt." In other words, it 
was asphalt which originally was not broken. That which is broken and can be repaired is 
transitory, and therefore temporary. Thus, her own declaration undermines her stated position. 
Plaintiff submits a declaration of the plaintiff, which is not really a matter to be 
reconsidered, but new evidence for which the plaintiff gives no reason could not have been 
presented in the initial motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff even tries to insert the hearsay 
statements borne of our own private investigatory efforts. These statements are inadmissable. 
Additionally, pictures not previously produced showing the scene of the accident four years after 
the slip and fall are submitted for "reconsideration," even though the court has never considered 
them. 
Plaintiff now argues that the slip and fall resulted from a design defect, although there is 
not now, nor within the motion was originally presented to the court, any evidence whatsoever 
that any defect that existed was by design or existed because of the way the asphalt was laid. 
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Again, in the plaintiffs own words, it was "broken asphalt." 
Plaintiff also claims that the matter should be reconsidered because defendants have 
failed to respond to discovery. Plaintiff points out that she filed a motion to compel in May of 
2007 and now asks the court to rule on the motion. Because plaintiff could have asked this court 
to rule on the motion to compel long before summary judgement was granted, any plea now to 
re-open this case for further discovery is simply unreasonable. If plaintiff had forgotten that she 
had filed a motion to compel, it was clearly put squarely to her attention when this court in its 
initial memorandum decision denying summary judgment noted that the motion to compel had 
been filed but not ruled upon because no notice to submit ever had been filed with the court. See 
July 2, 2007 Memorandum Decision pg. 2, note 1. Thus, even where the court pointed out that 
all plaintiff needed to do was file a notice to submit two months prior to ruling on this matter, 
plaintiff failed to do so. Accordingly, plaintiffs arguments that defendants have tied her hands 
fail. 
The sum and substance of plaintiff s opposition to the original summary judgment, which 
is now put forth again, is that speculation should rule the day. No material evidence of notice of 
a dangerous condition was brought forth. One thousand patrons crossed the same parking lot 
without complaint daily. Plaintiff herself, both the day before her fall and at the time she fell, did 
not see any defect in the asphalt. Plaintiff claims that notice after the fall, as well as other events 
after the fall, support an inference of notice prior to the fall. This court disagrees. 
Plaintiff is further speculating on how long the condition existed. Plaintiff is asking this 
court to submit the matter to a jury so the jury can speculate both on what caused the plaintiffs 
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fall, and if it was the condition of the parking lot, how long the condition had existed. In Goebel 
the court stated: 
[Not] only will the jury have to speculate about whether [defendant] had notice of the 
dangerous gap in the first place, it would also have to speculate about whether 
[defendant] had notice far enough in advance to repair the gap before [plaintiffs] 
accident. 
Goebel v Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co , 2004 UT 80 \ 25. As stated, this court will not submit a 
case of speculation to the jury for determination, since as a matter of law where speculation is 
employed the evidence does not preponderate one way or another. 
Challenge to venue. Plaintiffs challenge to venue in the American Fork department of 
the Fourth District Court is meritless. First, Utah Code Ann. §78-13-10 does not preclude 
transferring this case to the American Fork department.6 The venue provisions of the Utah Code 
provide that an action must be tried in the proper county. American Fork is in the same county as 
Provo. 
Plaintiff claims that the jury pools between Provo and American Fork will differ. There 
is no basis for plaintiffs contention. In fact, the jury pools and how they are selected are 
identical between Provo and American Fork. A single clerk, located in the Provo courthouse, 
compiles the jury pools from within Utah County for all juries in the county, whether located in 
Provo, Spanish Fork, Orem, or American Fork. 
Lastly, a party cannot wait until a final determination of the case and then challenge the 
venue where the case was decided. Plaintiff has simply waived this argument. 
6The case was assigned due to the recusal of the previously assigned judge. 
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PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL IS MOOT 
Because the court finds plaintiffs motion to reconsider to be procedurally defective, and 
because the court does not find a sufficient basis to set aside its previous memorandum decision 
and order, the issue of plaintiff s motion to compel has been rendered moot and is therefore 
denied. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
Defendant's motion to strike is granted. Plaintiff claims this court cannot consider the 
motion to strike unless the court first grants the motion to reconsider. Plaintiff makes this claim 
even though the pictures at issue are appended to the motion to reconsider and form the basis for 
the relief sought. This conclusion is illogical. The point is whether this court should consider 
them or strike them. 
Any materials not previously submitted to the other party prior to the initial motion for 
summary judgment should not be filed with the court. Plaintiff has not explained why she could 
not subpoena the photographs from the individual holding them long prior to the motion for 
summary judgment. New evidence should only be considered when a properly brought motion 
for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence is brought before the court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs motion to reconsider is denied both procedurally 
and upon the merits. Plaintiffs motion to compel is denied as being moot. Defendant's motion 
to strike the photographs submitted with the motion to reconsider is hereby granted. Defendant's 
counsel shall prepare an order consistent with rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 29th day of November, 2007. 
p David N. Mortensen 
|h District Court Judge 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DIVISION STATE OF UTAH 
NELDA P. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
GOLD'S GYM and PEAY INVESTMENT ] 
COMPANY ] 
Defendant. ) 
I Attachments to 
I PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
I SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
) RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
) GRANTING SUMMARY 
> JUDGMENT 
I Case NO: 070102050 
Judge: Hon. David N. Mortensen 
COMES NOW S. Austin Johnson counsel for Plaintiff Nelda P. Johnson and hereby attaches 
the documents attached to her Memorandum filed in support of her motion to reconsider the 
memorandum decision granting summary judgment, entered by the trial court on September 17, 
2007. These attachments were filed with Appellant Johnson's motion to reconsider, filed October 
10, 2008. These documents are submitted as the parts of the record to be used on appeal. 
1 
State of Utah ) 
) ss. 
County of Utah ) 
Declaration of Nelda Johnson 
Comes now Nelda P. Johnson, plaintiff in this cause of action, and hereby declares the 
following facts to be true, based upon her own knowledge, recollection and investigation, 
subject to penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Utah: 
1. I signed the contract to become a member. I did not think the clause applied ot 
the parking lot outside. I believed it only applied to usinjg the gym, the equipment, and 
their trainers. 
2. It was 9:30 pn at night when the accident happened. I did not see the ground very 
well. The evening was already getting dark. 
3. The day before, the one time I wen to the gym, I di not park in the same spot. I 
did not walk ver the area where the cracks were so extensive. I went in the morning to 
the gym. 
4. When I received the contract, the sales person did not point out the release, did 
not explain the contract, and did not give me time to read it. I believed it was only for 
me to become a member so I just looked at the price and the length of time I was 
committing to. She was talking to me about her husband, how he spoke Spanish and sells 
car insurance. She was giving me his address when I was signing the contract. 
5. The release is on the back side of the page and it was not conspicuous to me. I 
thought my signature was just to join the gym. I did not have any opportunity to bargain 
or negotiate the contents of the membership agreement, other than price and length of 
membership. 
6. I went to Gold's Gym and took pictures within a few weeks of the fall. The brace 
and crutches were given to me by the emergency room the night I fell. 
7. Then, I went back and had pictures taken in May 2005, about nine months after 
the fall. Gold's Gym still had done nothing to repair the broken asphalt. 
8. Finally, I went back to the property four years after the fall. I took pictures of the 
asphalt. They show where sporadic repairs were made, leaving other big holes in the 
asphalt. The line of repaired asphalt still shows where I fell. These pictures are attached. 
9. I investigated the person that the gym said redid their parking lot. He denied it. 
He says he lived in the same ward as /7^y P<°Us'>an- He had him install a home theater. 
The invoice was for that service. He never laid any asphalt or pavement at the gym. 
10. Other persons had called him about this. I understood he meant the other attorney, 
someone from their office, had called him about this same thing. The defendant knows 
the fact is false and they have not corrected it. 
I declare the above facts to be true under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of 
Utah on this £_ day of October, 2007. 
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DEPOSITION OF TROY PETERSON 
1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-Gj-S 
2 --0O.0--
3 (The deposition commenced at 12:47 P.M.) 
4 --0O0--
5 TROY PETERSON 
6 having been sworn to tell the truth 
7 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
8 testified as follows): 
9 --0O0--
10 EXAMINATION 
11 BY MR. JOHNSON: 
12 Q. Okay. Would you state your full name. 
13 A. Troy C. Peterson. 
14 Q. And what is your position at Gold's Gym? 
15 A. Vice president. 
16 Q. Do you have any ownership --
17 A. I do. 
18 Q. -- interest? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. What percentage ownership? 
21 A. Body Firm, 10 percent. 
22 Q. How is Body Firm related to Gold's Gym? 
23 A. It operates, the entity located at 460 
24 North 900 East, doing business as Gold's Gym. 
25 Q. How many facilities does Body Firm 
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1 operate? 
2 A- One. 
3 Q. Just the one at 900 East? 
4 A. Correct. 
5 Q. Do you have any ownership in any of the 
6 other Gold's Gyms throughout the 15 in the state of 
7 Utah? 
8 A. Yes, I do. 
9 Q. What percentage do you own in the other 
10 15? 
11 A. Between myself any wife, the equivalent of 
12 10 percent company-wide. 
13 Q. Okay. 
14 A. Some would be in my wife's name, some 
15 would be in mine. 
16 Q. Who is your wife? What's her name? 
17 A. Adrian Peterson. 
18 MR. JOHNSON: Off the record. 
19 (Off record). 
20 Q. (By Mr. Johnson) Have you given a deposition 
21 before? 
2 2 A. Yes, I have. 
2 3 Q. How many times? 
24 A. Two o r t h r e e . 
25 Q. O k a y . Has i t e v e r b e e n i n a c a s e r e l a t e d 
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for us? 
A. I think I have them. 
3 || Q. Would you like to bring them in? 
4 || A. Yeah. 
5 || Q. That would be great. 
6 || (Short break taken) . 
7 || Q. (By Mr. Johnson) Did you bring any other 
8 records with you that relate to Nelda Johnson or her 
9 injury or a claim made? 
10 A. That was all I could find. 
11 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. Let's mark this as 
12 Exhibit: 1. Should I make some copies? 
13 MS. THUET: Yes. Would you? 
14 (Short break.) 
15 Q. (By Mr. Johnson) How long have you been the 
16 vice president of Gold's Gym? 
17 A. 11 years. 
18 Q. Are you the only vice president? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. What's your specific area over which you 
21 serve as vice president? 
22 A. Probably, to be more clear, in the 
23 corporation, the vice president. The overall, for the 
24 company, my title would be CFO. 
25 Q. What are your duties as CFO? 
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1 A. Handle all the financial matters. Loans. 
2 Payments. Accounts payable. Receivable. Legal 
3 matters. All fall under that umbrella. 
4 Q. What does CFO stand for^ 
5 A. Chief financial officer. 
6 1 Q. Do you have any responsibility over 
7 maintenance of the property? 
8 A. A lot of that gets put under my umbrella, 
9 also. 
10 Q- Is there anybody else with more 
11 responsibilities than you over maintenance? 
12 A. CEO is Scott Felsted. But I think he 
13 would defer to me as far as maintenance. 
14 Q. Okay. Let me hand you the document that 
15 you brought for us today. And we'll have that marked 
16 as Exhibit 1 to your deposition. 
17 (Exhibit 1 marked for identification.) 
18 Q. Can you tell me what it is? 
19 A. It's notes on Nelda's membership. 
20 Q. What created these notes? 
21 A. Our billing company is Paramount. And 
22 they create the history. And our office has the 
23 ability to make notes in there also. 
24 Q. Do you know who at Paramount would have 
25 made this computer record? 
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1 Q. Okay. Have you ever discussed the fact 
2 that she was injured in your parking lot with anybody 
3 else in Gold's Gym? 
4 A. In the last three or four days, yes. 
5 Q. Okay. Prior to the last three or four 
6 days, have you ever discussed it? 
7 A. No, sir. 
8 Q. Will you tell me what this document is 
9 that I'm handing you now. 
10 A. (Reviews document). In your 
11 interrogatories, you asked for invoices regarding any 
12 kind of asphalt repair. And after much searching --
13 we moved our offices about a year and a half ago. And 
14 we made a mess of our filing system. This is what I 
15 believe to be the last repair on the asphalt. We did 
16 some seal coating on 9th East. So we made that copy. 
17 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. We'll mark that as 
18 Exhibit 2 to your deposition. 
19 (Exhibit 2 marked for identification.) 
20 Q. (By Mr. Johnson) And Exhibit 2 is a check, 
21 apparently, made out to Leading Edge Construction; 
22 is that correct? 
2 3 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Dated September 2005? 
25 A. Correct. 
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Q. Do you know who identified the work that 
Leading Edge Construction did in September 2005? 
A. I don't understand the question. 1 
Q. Who gave the scope of work to Leading Edge 
Construction? 
A. That would have been myself. 
Q. Do you remember what work you asked them 
to do? 
A. Some seal coating. 
Q. At the time you made that request, did you 
consider the injury that Nelda Johnson suffered in 
J your parking lot in 2004? 1 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Why did you ask them to do seal coating? 
A. They actually approached me, saying it 
looked like the parking lot could use a little 
freshening up. And I asked them to give me a bid; and 
thought it was appropriate, and asked them to do the 
work. 
Q. Do you recall who it was that approached 
you ? 1 
A. I don't remember his name. And I'm not 
100 percent sure that this is the correct name of the 
company. I'm -- I'm pretty sure, but I couldn't 1 
guarantee it. 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 


















DEPOSITION OF TROY PETERSON 13 II 
Do you know anybody that did the work? 
I don * t. 
You had never seen them before or after1 
this work? 
They called a couple of times about a 
other parking lots that we had. And I 
their bid at that time. 
And the company that called you, was their 
ing Edge Construction? 
I believe so. J 
Do you know what city they're located in? 
I don't. I 
When was the last time that you had any* J 















It would have been the day that we wrote 
k after they had done the work. 
And you still don't have any recollection 
ividual's name? 
I don' t. 
Do you recall why they said it looked like 
rig lot needed some repair? | 
They didn't say anything specific, no. 
Do you recall why you approved their bid? 
did you think it needed? jj 
They gave me three or four bids. And I 11 
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1 told them to go ahead on a couple of them, what I felt 
2 were fair and equitable. 
3 Q. Do you recall any work that you felt 
4 needed repair, or any condition that you felt needed 
5 repair? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. What did you describe to them as the work 
8 that they were to do? 
9 A. I'm not an asphalt expert, but seal 
10 coating is just filling in the tiny cracks so they 
11 don't expand and get bigger. 
12 Q. Were all cranks filled in? 
13 A. I believe so, yes. 
14 Q. What percentage of the parking lot did you 
15 have them fill cracks in? Over what percentage of the 
16 parking lot? 
17 A. Well, they would have filled everything in 
18 in the whole parking lot that had a small crack. 
19 Q. Okay. Why did you feel it was important 
20 to fill in cracks in the parking lot? 
21 A. So they wouldn't get any bigger. 
22 Q. Do you feel that cracks may pose dangers 
23 to patrons? 
24 A. There's more of an aesthetic fix than any 
25 kind of danger. 
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Q. So do you ever fill cracks if you feel 
that they pose a danger to patrons? 
A. We would do that, yes. 
Q. Have you ever seen a crack in the parking 
lot that you thought might pose a danger to a patron? 
A. I have not. 
Q. Do you have any plan for preventive 
maintenance on the parking lot? 
A. If it needs it, we would do maintenance in 
all areas on an as-need base. 
Q. Okay. So your only plan, then, is just as 
needed? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you've been working with Gold's Gym 
for 11 years? 
A. I have been vice president for 11 years. 
Q. And you made the lease with regards to the 
Gold's Gym at 900 East in February of 1995; is that 
correct? 
A. Scott Felsted signed that lease, yes. 
Q. And are you aware of any maintenance done 
on the parking lot since February of 1995, other than 
this resealing done in September of 2005? 
A. To the best of my memory, we redid thei 
parking lot in the summer of '97. 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
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1 Q. Okay. Do you know who did that? 
2 A. I do not know. 
3 Q. And so, then, you didn't have any work 
4 done from the summer of '97 until September of 2005; 
5 is that correct? 
g A. From our records, that would appear 
7 II correct. 
Q. And do you ever remember inspecting the 
9 II parking lot between the summer of ' 97 and prior to 
1 0 II September of 2005 to determine whether it needed 
1 1 II repair or maintenance? 
22 A. Occasionally walked through the parking 
13 lot and looked at it. 
24 Q. Did you ever prepare a report about that? 
25 A.. No. No, I did not. 
26 Q. Did you ever comment on the condition of 
17 the parking lot to anybody? 
28 A. No, I did not. 
2g Q. Did you ever have an opinion that it 
20 needed repair? 
22 A. No, I did not. 
22 Q- And after you got this report of an injury 
23 || in October of 2004 that's described in Exhibit 1, did 
24 || you go out and look at the parking lot at that time? 
25 || A. I don't even remember receiving the 
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1 their payment status? 
2 A. Usually, yes. 
3 Q. Is there any other basis for which they 
4 would be listed on the stop light status? 
5 A. Occasionally we have members get in 
6 altercations. 
7 Q. So discipline? 
8 A. Discipline them, breaking club rules, we 
9 won't allow them in the club. Those are usually the 
10 issues. 
11 Q. Have you ever considered whether Nelda 
12 Johnson broke any club rule? 
13 A. I have not, no. 
14 Q. Have you ever taken any disciplinary 
15 action against Nelda Johnson? 
16 A. Not to my knowledge, no. 
17 Q. Okay. Do you agree that Gold's Gym has 
18 the responsibility of maintaining and keeping in good 
19 repair the parking lot? 
20 A. Our lease on 900 East, I believe, reads 
21 that way, yes. 
22 Q. So the owner of the property does not have 
23 the responsibility to maintain or keep in good repair 
24 the parking lot at 900 East? 
25 A. I haven't read the lease close enough to 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
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1 to injuries in the parking lot? 
2 A. I'm not an attorney. I don't have an 
3 opinion on that. 
4 Q. Okay. Have you ever had any training with 
5 regard to what should be done to identify risks in the 
6 parking lot of dangerous conditions? 
7 A* Not past common sense. First call 911, 
8 and getting some emergency people to the facility. 
9 Q. So you haven't had any training that would 
10 help you identify when the condition of the parking 
11 lot may be dangerous, or when it may not be dangerous? 
12 A. No, I have not. 
13 Q. Do you keep any record of phone calls 
14 received by your office by your administrative 
15 offices? 
16 A. No, we don't. 
17 Q. Have you given any training to people that 
18 answer the phone in the office about what to do when 
19 somebody calls and complains about an injury they've 
20 suffered at Gold's Gym? 
21 A. Generally it's taken care of at the club 
22 level with an incident report. The staff is trained 
23 to take those. We don't get a lot of calls to the 
24 corporate office. 
2 5 Q. Okay. So you haven't trained anybody in 
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ask you any 
discoverabl 
thing we as 
DEPOSITION OF NATE LOFTIN 4 | 
In a deposition, it's our opportunity to 
question we can think of that may lead to 
e information in this lawsuit. The only 
k is that you tell the truth. II 
Are you under any medication or anything 



















Okay. What kind of education do you have?. 
I have an Associate's Degree in 
1 
Where did you get that? 
uvsc. 
What year did you graduate? 
2001. 
Okay. Are you in the military? 
No . 
Have you ever been in the military? 
No . 
Are you married? 
Yes. 
What's your wife's name? JJ 
MS. THUET: Objection. His wife's name is 
not relevant. jj 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, it is, because we may 
l 
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A. S c h o o l . - . . . • • 
Q. What's your position at Gold's Gym? 





How long have you worked for Gold's Gym? 
Since July of 1999. 
How long have you been the maintenance 
Since I have worked there. 
Q. So you were hired for the job as 
maintenance director? 
A. I -- I was hired as the only maintenance 
technician at the time, and have always been in charge 
of the department. 








What's his position? 
He is our chief financial officer 
Is he still the CFO? 
I believe so. 
What were your duties -- when you were 
hired, what were you told would be your duties as 
maintenance -- as in charge of maintenance? 
A. To maintain the equipment and building. 
Any duties to maintaining the company, equipment or 
building. 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
(801 )328-1188*1 -300-337-6629 
DEPOSITION OF NATE LOFTIN 7 
JL Q. Okay. What training have they given you? 
2 A. I have had training through our 
J3 manufacturers of our equipment. And then I have 
4 training in other areas of construction and technical 
f5 skills. 
\6 Q. What areas of construction have you worked 
7 in? 
|8 A. Electrical. Plumbing. Those two, mainly. 
9 Q. Okay. When you were hired, were you given 
110 any instructions about the asphalt in the parking lot 
1|1 area? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Since being hired, have you ever been 
i4 given instructions about maintenance you should be 
15 concerned with related to the parking lot or pavement? 
16 A. Where? 
17 Q. At the 900 East Gold's Gym. 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Have you ever inspected the parking lot or 
20 pavement at 900 East at Gold's Gym? 
21 A. No. 
^2 Q. Is there anybody else besides you who 
23 would be m charge of maintaining the parking lot or 
£4 pavement at Gold's Gym, 900 East Gold's Gym parking 
25 lot? 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q• Do you consider that within your duties, 
3 the inspection and maintenance of that parking lot? 
4 A. If -- if I am asked to, yes. If it needs 
5 to be done, yes. 
6 Q. Okay. How would you determine if it needs 
7 to be done? 
8 A. I'm not qualified to make that decision, 
9 so I would call an outside source to look at it. An 
10 asphalt company. 
11 Q. Have you ever called an asphalt company? 
ll2 A. No. 
13 Q. Who reviews your performance? 
1,4 A, Troy Peterson. 
15 Q. Have you ever had any reviews with him? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. How often do you have reviews? 
18 A. Quarterly. 
19 Q. Does your salary depend on reviews? 
2 0 A. No. 
21 Q. Are the reviews ever for the purpose of 
22 possibly increasing your wages? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Okay. What are the purpose of the 
25 reviews? 
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A. I would say internal, how the company is 
doing internally. 
Q. What are your concerns with internal 
performance of the company for which you may be 
reviewed? 
A. I would say the -- the state of equipment, 
and the building at each location. 
Q. Okay. Have you ever inspected the asphalt 
pavement or parking lot at any facility owned by 
Gold's Gym? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which buildings have you inspected the 
asphalt? 
A. In West Jordan, our location in 
West Jordan. 
Q. Any others? 
A. No. 
Q. When did you inspect it at West Jordan? 
A. I don't know the exact time. It was 
sometime in 2006. 
Q. Do you remember the season? 
A. I want to say it was spring. 
Q. Okay. Why did you inspect it? 
A. A member reported that we had a pothole in 
the parking lot. 
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1 Q. What did you find when you inspected it? 
2 II A. There was a pothole there. 
3 Q. You found one? 
4 A. Uh-huh. 
5 Q. And what did you do with it? 
6 A. We barricaded it off until the asphalt 
7 company, which was called by the property owner, fixed 
8 it. 
9 Q. So you called the property owner? 
10 A. Yes. 
l|l II Q. And had them fix it? 
12 A. Uh-huh. 
lt3 Q. Do you remember who the member was that 
14 had reported the pothole? 
15 A. I do not. 
16 Q. Had there been any accident involved with 
17 the pothole? 
18 A. Not to my knowledge. 
19 Q. Did you fill out any written document 
20 describing your inspection and findings? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Did you just give a verbal report? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Who to? 
25 A. Troy Peterson. Ron Littlebrant. 
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Q. Anybody else? 
A. No. 
Q. How much did it cost to fix the pothole? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. What -- approximately how much surface 
area of pavement was covered with new asphalt? 
A. To my knowledge, the pothole was roughly, 
I would say, 18 inches in diameter, and three-quarters 
of an inch deep. 
Q. And why did you believe it needed to be 
covered? 
A. To -- so there wasn't any injury or 
accident to any of the members or their property. 
Q. Did you believe, if it was not covered, 
that it may pose a risk of danger to property owners 
or members? 
A. I think with further neglect, it could 
have 
Q. What guidelines do you use to determine 
whether asphalt needs to be covered or replaced? 
A. I think I answered that. I would -- I 
would -- I don't have the skill or knowledge to make 
that decision. 
Q. Okay. So you call an outside contractor? 
A. Yes. 
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1 Q. When do you decide that it's time to call 
2 an outside contractor with regard to pavement? 
3 ]] A. It's obviously in the report of there 
4 being a problem, a potential problem. It would be 
5 looked at and addressed. That would be the main case 
6 for it. 
7 Q. Okay. Are you aware of any other reports 
8 of problems or potential problems with asphalt, other 
9 than the one at West Jordan in 2006? 
JlO A. NO. 
11 Q. How many properties does Gold's Gym own or 
JL2 operate? 
13 A. Currently, 15. 
14 Q. And that's in which counties? 
15 A. Utah, Salt Lake. Is Bountiful considered 
3i6 Weber County? I'm not sure what county that is. 
1[7 Q. Okay. Bountiful? 
iB \\ A. Uh-huh. And we have two southern 
l|9 locations. One in Cedar City, and one in St. George. 
2|0 Q. And is it within your duty to assure that 
2|1 all of the parking lot are safe at all 15 locations? 
22 A. Yes. 
2(3 Q. Have you ever been sent to any classes by 
2|4 II Gold's Gym to learn how to better perform your duties 
25 II as maintenance director? 
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Q. How many times have you gone to classes? 
A. I would say two times. 
Q. How long were each of the classes? 
A. Three to five days class. Each class 
being six, roughly six hours. 
Q. Okay. Did any of the classes deal with 
maintenance of the property? The parking lots? 
A. No. 
Q. For the property at 900 East in Provo, do 
you consider that the owner of the property has any 
responsibility regarding maintenance of the parking 
lot? 






-- what his requirement is there. 
Who is the owner of that property? 
I don't know . 
So you've never gone to anybody at the 
owner and asked them to do any maintenance, or 
reported any problems to them? 
A. No. 
Q. With the machines, what kind of 
maintenance do you do with the maintenance in Gold's 
Gvm? 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
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1 A. We do repair and scheduled maintenance. 
2 Q. How often do you do repairs and scheduled 
3 maintenance? 
4 A. Repairs are done when needed. The 
5 scheduled maintenance items are done as to the 
6 manufacturer's recommendations, generally. 
7 Q. What are the recommendations, if you can 
8 give a ballpark? 
9 A. They're very, very broad. Some could be 
10 as often as a week. Others could, be every year. 
11 Q. Okay. How much -- do you do the 
12 maintenance yourself, or do you have other people that 
13 do it? 
14 A. I have employees that do that. I do some, 
15 but mainly employees now. 
il6 Q. How many employees do you have under you? 
17 A. 10. 
18 Q. How much time do you think it takes you 
19 and your 10 employees to, during the year, to provide 
$0 repairs or scheduled maintenance to the equipment? 
21 What percentage of your time? 
?2 A. I don't understand the question. 
23 Q. Out of your work year for you and your 10 
^4 employees, what percentage of time do you spend doing 
25 repairs or scheduled maintenance to the equipment? 




























jj&ruMinjrv ut INAUL JLUMJTN ib II 
I would -- 95 percent. 
So that's primarily your job, then? 
Yes . 
Okay. Have you ever asked any employee to 
sponsibility over the pavement or parking 
? II 
No. 
Are you aware of any injuries to any 
Gold's Gym caused by the machines or 1 
No. 
Are you familiar with the contract from 
No. 
Tell me what you've heard about the --
Tell me, who is Kandi Negrete? Who is 
She is the manager of the gym on 900 East. 
Do you know anybody else from Gold's Gym 
g to testify today? 
Yes . II 
Who is that? 
Troy Peterson. n 
Anybody else? Jl 
Lynette Felsted. 
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1 Q. Who are they? What are their positions? 
2 A. I've given Troy's title to the company. 
3 Lynette Felsted is an owner. 
4 Q. Anybody else? 
5 A. Not to my knowledge. 
6 Q. Okay. Do you know about the accident 
7 complained of in this litigation? 
8 A. Do I -- would you be more specific, 
9 please? 
10 Q. Have you heard of any injury suffered by 
11 Nelda Johnson at Gold's Gym at 900 East? 
12 A. I don't know the details of an injury. 
13 Q. So do you know how she alleges she hurt 
14 her knee? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Has anybody discussed this lawsuit with 
17 you? 
18 A* Not -- not in any detail. 
19 Q. Okay. Has anybody ever told you that she 
20 claims she fell in a crack in the parking lot? 
21 A. Three days ago. 
22 Q. Okay. Who told you that? 
23 A. Troy Peterson. 
24 Q. Tell me what he told you. 
25 A. He told me that I would need to be 

































for a deposition on this date, because of the 
So would that be January 29th, 2007, was 
time you heard about this incident? 
Yes. 
What did he tell you to do to prepare for 
this deposition? 





What have you done to prepare? 
Nothing. 
Okay. You just came with the knowledge 
1 il 








Thank you. So do you know where the 
in this case alleges she fell? 
No. 
And you haven't looked at the parking lot 








And nobody told you where? II 
No . 
Have you ever been told that there was any 
about the condition of the parking lot at 
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900 East in Provo? 
No 
Q. Have you ever been instructed about what's 
required to maintain a parking lot in a safe 
condition? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know what injuries or accident 
Nelda Johnson suffered? 
A. No 
Q. In some answers to interrogatories, your 
name was given as somebody who may have information 
about maintenance and repairs to the parking lot at 
900 East in Provo, Utah. Do you know of any 
maintenance or repairs ever being made to the parking 
lot there? 
A. I don't know specific dates on those. 
Q. Do you know of some having been performed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell me if you can approximate the year 
when that repair was done. 
A. To my knowledge, approximately 2004. 
Q. Do you know what was done? 
A. Just a resealing, a surface resealing of 
the parking lot. 
Q. Do you know if it was before or after 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
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1 Q. Do you know who Billy Banks is? Is that 
2 his name? 
3 A, Is he the one that's on television? 
4 Q- Yes. 
5 I A. If he is, that's -- I think that's the guy 
6 on television, but I'm not sure. 
7 Q. Okay. Have you ever seen his routine, the 
8 aerobics? 
9 A. No. Not really, unh-unh. 
10 Q. Is Tae Bo similar to kick boxing, do you 
11 know? 
12 A. I -- I -- I don't know enough to really 
13 know. That's not my expertise. 
14 Q. Okay. So have you had any -- exercised 
15 any supervision or control over any maintenance done 
16 to the property at Gold's Gym? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Would you know whether a crack in the 
19 asphalt in the parking lot could become a dangerous 
20 condition or a hazard for patrons? 
21 A, I haven't noticed anything. 
22 Q. Okay. But would you -- would you believe 
23 that one could become one if it were allowed to become 
24 a big enough crack? 
25 MS. THUET: Objection to the extent it 
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puts facts not in evidence. 
2 II A. I imagine it would be. 
3 Q. Okay. And so do you believe Gold's Gym 
4 has the responsibility to not allow the parking lot to 
5 become that kind of a hazard? 
6 A. I am not sure if we are even in charge of 
7 the parking lot. 
8 Q. Okay. You're not sure if Gold's Gym is 
9 responsible to maintain the parking lot? 
10 A. I don't think we own the building. 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 A. So I'm -- I'm not really sure. 
13 Q. You signed the lease, didn't you? 
14 A. I don't remember. 
15 Q. Let me show you a document dated February 
16 3rd, 1995. And this is a lease between Peay 
17 Investment Corporation and Body Firm Aerobics. Have 
18 you seen this document before? 
19 A. I've signed a few documents, so I -- can I 
20 look for my name? 
21 Q. Sure. 
22 A. Yeah, I guess I have. I signed my name. 
23 Q. So that's your signature at the bottom of 
24 this lease? 
2 5 A. U h - h u h . Y e a h . 
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Q. And in that lease, Body Firm Aerobics is 
the name listed under the tenant, and then you signed 
as president. Is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Does Body Firm Aerobics operate any other 
location other than the one at 900 East? 
A. No. I don't think so. 
Q. Okay. And is Body Firm Aerobics the same 
as Gold's Gym? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. Under Paragraph 8.2 of the lease, 
it says: That tenant's sole cost and expense, tenants 
shall keep and maintain the premises and all 
improvements thereon, including the exterior, parking 
lot, et cetera. 
What did you do, or what have you done as 
an owner of Gold's Gym to maintain the parking lot at 
900 East? 
A. I personally have not dealt with that. 
Q. Okay. Do you know who did? 
A. Unh-unh. 
Q. So have you ever directed that there 
should be any program for inspecting the parking lot 
to make sure that it didn't have any hazard, hazardous 
condition? 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
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H DEPOSITION OF LYNETTE FELSTED 12 
1 A. Not me p e r s o n a l l y , no . 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. I just do the aerobics. 
4 Q. Okay. And have you ever been involved in 
5 any meeting with the officers in directing that there 
6 be that kind of a program? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. Have you ever received any report from 
9 anybody as the president of Gold's Gym of an 
10 inspection of the property -- of the parking lot? 
11 A. Not to my knowledge. 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 MS. THUET: I would just like to clarify 
14 that she's not signed as the president of Gold's Gym. 
15 That lease is signed as her position as the president 
16 of Body Firm Aerobics. 
17 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
18 Q. (By Mr. Johnson) Is there anybody else who is 
19 an officer in Gold's Gym other than yourself? 
2 0 A. I don't know. 
21 Q. Do you consider yourself to be in charge 
22 of Gold's Gym at 900 East? 
23 A. It's really more of a company. I just do 
24 the aerobics. 
2 5 Q. Okay. Do you know what testimony you're 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
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DEPOSITION OF LYNETTE FELSTED 18 
1 Q. Okay. So at that time would you expect 
2 that somebody would investigate that complaint of an 
3 injury? 
4 A. I cannot speak for someone else. 
5 Q. But in setting policy for the people that 
6 work under you in -Gold's Gym, would you expect that 
7 they would investigate a complaint of an injury when 
8 they receive a complaint? 
9 A. Yeah, I would hope so. 
10 Q. Okay. Do you know if anybody investigated 
11 this complaint of an injury? 
12 A. I don't know. 
13 Q. When would you like to be told of a 
14 complaint of an injury if one was received by Gold's 
15 Gym? 
16 A. Immediately. 
17 Q. So as the president, you would hope to be 
18 informed? 
19 A. Oh, well, that's not my department. 
2 0 .-. Q. . So --
21 A. So I -- I -- honestly, I can only deal 
22 with so much. And I just have my little department 
2 3 that I deal with. 
2 4 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. I think those 
2 5 are all the questions that we have. So thank you very 
DepomaxMerit Litigation Services 
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DEPOSITION OF KANDI NEGRETE 10 
Q. Who provides the interpretation of the 
contract? 
A. I don't understand the question. 
Q. Who explains a contract to a new member? 
A. We have the contract in writing, and we 
ask the member to read it. 
Q. Okay. Do you explain it? 
A. No. It's not our job to explain the 
contract. 
Q. Okay. Do you understand it? 
A. I believe I understand the contract. 
Q. Okay. Have you ever seen Nelda Johnson 
before today? 
A. Is this Nelda Johnson? 
Q. Yes, it is. 
A. She looks familiar. 
Q. When do you think — do you recall when 
you've seen her before? 
A. It's definitely been some time. I don't 
recall exactly when. 
Q. Okay. As you do your walk-through, what 
are you looking for? 
A. What are we looking for? 
Q, With regard to maintenance. 
A. Anything that's obviously dirty, in need 
DepomaxMeri t Lit igation Services 
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DEPOSITION OF KANDI NEGRETE 
1 Q. Okay. Were there any other assistant 
2 managers besides yourself in July of 2004? 
3 A. No. 
4 L (Cell phone interruption.) 
5 Q. (By Mr. Johnson) Do you recall what you were 
6 doing as far as your employment in July of 2004? 
7 A. I don't understand the question. 
8 Q. What were your duties at Gold's Gym as 
9 assistant manager in July of 2004? 
10 A. Selling memberships. 
11 I. Q. Okay. So as an assistant manager, you 
12 didn't concern yourself very much with maintenance of 
13 the property, or premises, or equipment? 
14 A. Not much. 
15 Q. So your duties were more focused on sales? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Okay. When you became manager, did your 
18 duties then include responsibility for maintenance of 
19 equipment and premises? 
2C A. I didn't -- I don't do maintenance. 
21 Q. Okay. Do you know -- let's see -- Nate 
22 Loftin? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Does he work under you? 
25 A. I don't know if you'd call it under me. 
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Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE 
A. They're all in Orem. 
Q. Okay. Do you know Brad Peay? 
A. Brad Peay? I know Brad Tregeagle. I 
don't know Brad Peay. 
Q. Okay. How much education have you 
completed? 
THE WITNESS: Is that a relevant question? 
MR. JEFFS: He's entitled to get some 
background information. 
A. I had two years of college. 
Q. BYU? 
A. No. University of Utah. 
Q. What did you study? 
A. Architecture. 
Q. Did you ever work as. an architect? 
A. Part time. 
Q. How many years did you work part time as 
an architect ? 
A. Probably eight. 
Q. And what were those years? 
A. Would have been 1953.to 1961. 
Q. Now, what have you done as your career 
since then, basically? 
A. Well, at that time, I was working for 
Anderson Lumber as an estimator, plan drawer. And I 
Alison Seifridge, CSR, CRI, RDR 
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Q By Mr. Johnson -LYNNTREGEAGLE 
left there, and formed my own company, Tregeagle Fi: 
Floors, a floor covering business. 
Q. Where was that located? 
A. That's on 9th East just south of Gold's 
Gym. 
Q. In Prove? 
A. In Prove. I own that building. 
Q. So is it in the same — 
A. It's across the street. South of 450 
North. 
Q. Is there, oh, a hamburger place across the 
street there? 
A. No. The hamburger place you're talking 
about would have been Stan's Drive-in. 
Q. Right. 
A. Across 9th East. I'm acrcss 450 North. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Behind the bank. 
Q. Okay. And so how many years have you had 
the floor covering store? 
A. I opened that in 1961. 
Q. And it still does business now? 
A. No, no. 
Q. When did it stop doing business? 
•A. Oh, boy. 1983. '86. Along through there 
Alison-Self ridge1, CSR, CHI, RDR 
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Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE 11 
Q. O k a y . 
A- And I don't know what year it was. I have 
a hunch it was 1358, but I'm not positive about that. 
Q. Did you get to provide any floor covering 
at any time --
A. No, I didn• t . 
Q. -- in Gold's Gym? 
Did you have any other career other than 
running your floor covering business until 1986? 
A. I became an artist for a while. And then 
I went into the construction business, constructing 
homes on my own personal property. 
Q. What did you build? 
A. What did I build? Homes. Residences. 
Q. No commercial building? 
A. Not in Provo. 
Q. Have you done commercial building 
elsewhere? 
A. No, I haven't. I haven't. 
Q. How many homes have you built? 
A. Probably 10. Nine. Jtfine. 
Q. Have you had any duties or work 
responsibility with regard to the Gold's Gym property 
at any time since 1953? 
A. Have I had? 
Alison Selfridge, CSFT, CRI, RDR 
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that stuff. That was all the responsibility of Gold's 
G y m . • • • . 
Q. Okay. So ever since the property was 
leased to them, you don't think Peay Investments has 
had any records at all about the condition of the 
parking lot? 
A. As far as I'm concerned, they didn't. 
Because it was Gold's Gym's responsibility to take 
care of it. 
Q. Okay. Do you know if there would be any 
records that would discuss the condition of the 
parking lot when you leased the property to Gold's Gym 
in Q C, q 9 
A, No. Other than -- other than what is in 
the lease. 
Q. Were there pictures --
' A. No. 
Q. — when you leased the property? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know when the last picture of that 
property was taken? 
A. I have no idea. No idea. 
Q. Do you have any records where maybe there' 
might be some pictures of the parking lot? 
A. I've got a picture of the front of the 
Alison Selfridge, CSR, CRI, RDR 
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Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE 
a w a y ? 
A. N o . 
MR. JEFFS: No, you don't know? Or no, 
she did not. 
A. I don't know. 
Q.. Do you feel you have more knowledge of the 
workings of Peay Investments than she has? 
A . I don't think so. 
Q. You think she knows more than you do? 
A. I have no clue as to what she knows. 
She's had it for two years more than I have. She 
might have learned a little bit more than I did. 
Q. So at this time, do you know of anybody 
who has ever patched or paved the parking, lot at 
Gold's Gym in Provo? 
A. Not prior to 1995. 
Q. Okay. And do you know of anybody who has 
done it since 1995? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. So virtually you don't know of anybody who 
has ever done any work on the parking lot at Gold's 
Gym? 
A- No. Hasn't been my responsibility to 
know. 
So vour answer is nor 
Alison Selfridge, CSR, CRI, RDR 
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Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE 
property. That's a little overbroad. 
Q. (By Mr. Johnson) When we say "maintenance 
to the property," I mean, are you aware of any 
maintenance to the parking ior at Gold's Gym prior to 
1395? 
A. I cign ' t have any knowledge prior to 1995. 
net. w JL Z y c: a A. jr d • j w . 
Q. Okay. 
A. If I did, I've long, forget it. 
Q. And you're not aware of any preventive 
maintenance to the parking lot since 1995; is that 
correct? 
A . . No . 
Q. Let just ask yon, with your, floor covering 
business, I would assume you were familiar with what 
might constitute a trip hazard? 
THE WITNESS: That doesn't pertain to 
this, does it? 
MR. JEFFS: But if you know. 
Q. (By Mr. Johnson) So tell me when you 
would install a floor, how much immediate change in 
elevation would you consider a trip hazard? 
A. I don't want to answer that. 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, we'll certify that to 
the court also. I have the riqht to ask the court. 
Alison Selfridge, CSFT, CRl, RDR 
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Q By Ms. Thuet - LYNN TREGEAGLE 
I'd have go bacn and find out when they 
siqned the lease on that McDonald parking lot. I'm 
not familiar with vjnen tha~ happened. 
Q. Okay. And where was this Gold's Gym -- or 
the McDonalds building located in relation to the 
Gold's Gym building? 
A, It. was the far north end of the property 
on the opposite end, starting at the south. You got 
•^Gold's Gym on the south. Then Paul Mitchell Beauty 
Salon. Then Little Caesars. Then it was McDonalds on 
the north end of that. 
Q. And dc you have any estimate as to when 
that occurred? 
A. Roughly 2002. 2004. I'm not sure. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Without going back and checking the 
records. 
questions? 
MS. THUET: Okav 
MR .- JOHMSQN: 
Thank YOU 
w V W )u have any other 
MS. THUET: No. 
oOi 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JOHNSON: 
n Let me eiS& vou a >;ew, ;t t o f o l l o w u o . 
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Was the old McDonalds in ihe same row of 
buildings as the Gold's Gym and the hair salon school 
A. They was a separaz^ building. 
Q. Okay. Is there still a building there 
where it used to be? 
A. No, no. 
Q. Is there still a McDonalds at the 
property ? 
A. No. 
Q. What's the furthest north building on the 
property now? 
A. It -- the three buildings are adjacent to 
each other. Gold's Gym on the south, and then.Paul 
Mitchell, and little Caesers -- who have moved out. 
Their lease expired, and they've moved out now. And 
that's all the buildings that are on that property. 
Q. And'there isn't a building further north 
that's some kind of a food establishment? 
a No 
Q. That's not stuck to — 
A. Wellf there's a building there, but it 
doesn't belong to Peay Investment. 
Q . Okay. 
A. There's a Hoqi Yogi in there. I don't 
know who owns that. 
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Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE 
.^•t" v c u r o r o p 6 r t. v 
Q. And rhe McDcnaIds was actually physically 
stuck no the nortn wail of Little Caesars? 
A . Mo, i"io . 11 was separate. 
Q. Hew far was is it separated from there? 
A. ot 
•.Q. Okay. And so then there was a parking lot 
in that 50 to 60 feet from the north wall of Little 
Caesars? 
A. Right. 
Q. To the McDonalds? 
A. Right. 
Q. And now you've just totally removed the 
McDonalds building? 
A. And paved it over. 
Q. When you paved, that parking lot after you 
removed the McDonald building, hew much pavement did 
you do? Do you know? 
A. I don't have any idea. 
Well, as far as I know, just the -- just 
the building itself. 
Q. Okay. So when you took down the building, 
there was a hole there, and you just covered the 
hole --
Alison Self ridge, CSR, CRI, RDR 
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Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE 5 2 
A. £ i qnz . R i g h t . 
Q. -- where the building *as. 
And yen don't know of any repaving or 
paving that you aid on any of the parking lot other 
chan where you had -~ 
A. I'm not aware of any. 
Q. -- taken out the building itself? 
A. I'm net aware of any. 
Q. So any pavenent that you did at that time 
probably was 50 to 60 feet north of the corner of 
Little Caesars? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Do you remember if that work was done 
before or after this injury -- this alleged injury in 
July of 200-J ? 
A. I wouldn't be sure of that. 
Q. Would you have reoords that might still 
reflect that? 
A. I can go back and check out when we paid 
for it. 
Q . Okay. 
A. And that sort of thing. 
Q. Would your records show who did the 
pavement ? 
They probably would, 
AlisorrSelfridge; CSR, CRI, RDR 
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A. Because i~'s standing up there. Somebody 
could crip over ic. 
C?. So that's a trip hazard? 
A. CcuId be. 
Q. If you have a pothole, and there's an edge 
of the pothole that creates a three-quarter inch 
ledge, does that cause you concern? 
A. . There isn't one there that I — I'm aware 
of. And i can't answer whether it would be, or 
whether it wouldn't be. : 
Q. You said if there's a three-quarter inch 
elevation change in the asphalt, than that's a trip 
hazard. Do you consider --
MS. TKUET: Objection to the extent it 
misstates his former testimony. 
Q. (3y Mr; Johnson) Do you consider a 
half-inch elevation change a trip hazard? 
A. I just told you that a smooth surface 
could be a trip hazard. 
®*v Okay. That wasn't my question. Do you 
consider a half-inch ledge in asphalt to be a trip 
hazard? 
Alison-Self ridge-, GSR, CRI, R DR 
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Q By Mr. Johnson - LYNN TREGEAGLE 5 6 
A. I ' c! have ro say yes . 
Q.. OKay. On une several occasions you've 
viewed :he parking loi, nave you ever viewed it 
specifically tc determine whether there might be a 
trip hazard? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. Have you ever expressed any opinion to 
Gold's Gym of any condition that you feel they should 
maintain? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. And you've never viewed the property with 
that purpose? 
A. No. 
MR. JOHNSON: I have no other questions. 
Thank you. 
MR. JEFFS: Okay. We're done. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you for coming. 
(Signature not reserved.) 
(The deposition concluded at 10:58 a.m.) 
--GOO~-
(Right to read and sign above deposition 
not reserved by deponent or attorney as required under, 
new Rules of Civil Procedure 30(e) for cases filed 
a fter No vernber 1 9 99 . ) 
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Ch. 13 CONDITION AND USE OF LAND § 343 
k. Where warning inadequate. There will, however, be 
special situations in which the possessor has knowledge of facts 
from which he should realize that an ordinary warning will not 
be sufficient to notify the licensee of the danger, or to enable 
him to protect himself against it. Thus where the possessor 
knows that the licensee is blind, illiterate, or a foreigner, or a child 
too young to be able to read, it is not enough to rely upon a 
posted notice to give warning of the danger, and the possessor 
may still be required to exercise reasonable care to give adequate 
warning in some other way. In extreme cases, as in the case of 
the blind man, he may even be required to give physical assistance 
to enable the licensee to avoid the danger. 
I. Dangers known to licensee. The licensee, who enters 
land with no more than bare permission, is entitled to nothing 
more than knowledge of the conditions and dangers which he 
will encounter if he comes. If he is warned of the actual con-
ditions, and the dangers involved, or if he discovers them for 
himself without such warning, and fully understands and ap-
preciates the risk, he is in a position to make an intelligent 
choice as to whether the advantage to be gained is sufficient to 
justify him in incurring the risk by entering or remaining. 
Therefore, even though a dangerous condition is concealed and 
not obvious, and the possessor has given the licensee no warn-
ing, if the licensee is in fact fully aware of the condition and 
the risk, there is no liability to him. 
TITLE E. SPECIAL LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS 
OF LAND TO INVITEES 
§ 3 4 3 . Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by 
Possessor 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical 
harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land 
if, but only if, he
 t<yvIt5WcrfW ^huu 
(a) knows or by the exercisejpf reasonable care would 
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves 
an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect^ that they will not discover or re-
alize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves 
against it, and 
Pee Appendix for Reporter's Votes, Court Citations, and Cross Beferenoes 
215 
Vvfti*! qVffc 
§ 3 4 3 TORTS, SECOND Ch. 13 
^^7£j ^ fails to exercise reagonable care to protect them 
st~fv<^ ^yagaijjgt the danger. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. This Section should be read together with §343 A, 
which deals with the effect of the fact that the condition is 
known to the invitee, or is obvious to him, as well as the fact 
that the invitee is a patron of a public utility. That Section 
limits the liability here stated. In the interest of brevity, the 
limitation is not repeated in this Section. 
b. Distinction between duties to licensee and invitee. One 
who holds his land open for the reception of invitees is under 
a greater duty in respect to its physical condition than one who 
permits the visit of a mere licensee. The licensee enters with 
the understanding that he will take the land as the possessor 
himself uses it. Therefore such a licensee is entitled to expect 
only that he will be placed upon an equal footing with the pos-
sessor himself by an adequate disclosure of any dangerous condi-
tions that are known to the possessor. On the other hand an 
invitee enters upon an implied representation or assurance that 
the land has been prepared and made ready and safe for his re-
ception. He is therefore entitled to expect that the possessor will 
exercise reasonable care to make the land safe for his entry, 
or for his use for the purposes of the invitation. He is entitled 
to expect such care not only in the original construction of the 
premises, and any activities of the possessor or his employees 
which may affect their condition, but also in inspection to discover 
their actual condition and any latent defects, followed by such 
repair, safeguards, or warning as may be reasonably necessary 
for his protection under the circumstances. 
As stated in § 342, the possessor owes to a licensee only the 
duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to him dangerous 
conditions which are known to the possessor, and are likely not 
to be discovered by the licensee. To the invitee the possessor 
owes not only this duty, but also the additional duty to exercise 
reasonable affirmative care to see that the premises are safe for 
the reception of the visitor, or at least to ascertain the condition 
of the land, and to give such warning that the visitor may de-
cide intelligently whether or not to accept the invitation, or may 
protect himself against the danger if he does accept it. 
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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will fail to protect himself notwithstanding such knowledge. 
See § 343 A and Comments. 
TITLE D. SPECIAL LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS 
OF LAND TO LICENSEES 
§ 3 4 2 . Dangerous Conditions Known to Possessor 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical 
harm caused to licensees by a condition on the land if, 
but only if, 
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of 
the condition and should realize that it involves an un-
reasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should 
expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, 
and 
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the 
condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition 
and the risk involved, and 
(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know 
of the condition and the risk involved. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. The words "the risk" denote not only the existence of 
a risk, but also its extent. Thus "knowledge" of the risk in-
volved in a particular condition implies not only that the condition 
is recognized as dangerous, but also that the chance of harm 
and the gravity of the threatened harm are appreciated. 
b. If the licensees are adults, the fact that the condition 
is obvious is usually sufficient to apprise them, as fully as the 
possessor, of the full extent of the risk involved in it. 
On the other hand, the possessor should realize that the fact 
that a dangerous condition is open to the perception of child 
licensees may not be enough to entitle him to assume that they 
will appreciate the full extent of the risk involved therein. As to 
this, see § 343 B. 
e. The possessor's duty also arises if he has had peculiar 
experience which enables him to realize the risk involved in a 
condition which he should recognize as unlikely to be appre-
ciated by his licensee as an ordinary man or where he knows 
See Appendix *or Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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§ 3 3 1 . Gratuitous Licensee Defined 
[The Section is omitted. The matter is now covered by 
§330.] 
§ 3 3 2 . Invitee Defined 
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business 
visitor. 
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter 
or remain on land as a member of the public for a pur-
pose for which the land is held open to the public. 
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to 
enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or in-
directly connected with business dealings with the pos-
sessor of the land. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. Invitee. "Invitee" is a word of art, with a special mean-
ing in the law. This meaning is more limited than that of "in-
vitation" in the popular sense, and not all of those who are 
invited to enter upon land are invitees. A social guest may be 
cordially invited, and strongly urged to come, but he is not an 
invitee. (See § 330, Comment h.) Invitees are limited to those 
persons who enter or remain on land upon an invitation which 
carries with it an implied representation, assurance, or under-
standing that reasonable care has been used to prepare the prem-
ises, and make them safe for their reception. Such persons fall 
generally into two classes: (1) those who enter as members 
of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the 
public; and (2) those who enter for a purpose connected with 
the business of the possessor. The second class are sometimes 
called business visitors; and a business visitor is merely one kind 
of invitee. There are many visitors, such as customers in shops, 
who may be placed in either class. 
6. Invitation and permission. Although invitation does not 
in itself establish the status of an invitee, it is essential to it. 
An invitation differs from mere permission in this: an invita-
tion is conduct which justifies others in believing that the pos-
sessor desires them to enter the land; permission is conduct 
justifying others in believing that the possessor is willing that 
they shall enter if they desire to do so. Any words or conduct 
See Appendix for Reporter's Votes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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regardless of the manner of entry, so long as the entry itself is 
not privileged. The determining fact is the presence or absence 
of a privilege to enter or to remain on the land, and the status 
of an accidental trespasser is still that of a trespasser. 
Illustration: 
1. Without any negligence on his part A, standing 
on the platform of a subway station of the X Company, 
slips and falls onto the tracks. While there he is run over 
by the train of X Company, and injured. A is a trespasser, 
and the liability to him is determined by the rules stated in 
§§ 333 and 336, notwithstanding the accidental character 
of his intrusion. 
§ 3 3 0 . Licensee Defined 
A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or 
remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's con-
sent. 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. Meaning of "licensee." The definition of "licensee" now 
adopted in this Section, and used throughout this Restatement, is 
in accord with that which is in common usage by the courts, the 
bar, and legal writers. Occasionally, however, other meanings 
have been given to the term. In some instances "licensee" has 
been used to include any person who enters or remains on land 
with the consent of the possessor, including those who are classi-
fied as "invitees" under § 332. Where this meaning is given 
to "licensee," it becomes necessary to adopt some qualifying 
term to apply to those who enter by virtue of the consent given 
and nothing more; and such persons are sometimes called "gra-
tuitous," "bare," or "naked" licensees. The great majority of 
the decisions continue to distinguish between "licensees" and 
"invitees," and to limit "licensee" to those who enter only by 
virtue of the consent of the possessor, without more. This defi-
nition follows that usage. 
Occasionally, also, "licensee" has been used to include those 
who enter by authority of law, or under some other privilege, 
irrespective of the consent of the possessor. Such persons are 
covered in § 345, where the rules stated are the same as those 
applicable to licensees as defined in this Section. While there 
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and. Cross References 
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TOPIC 8. LIABILITY OF PERSONS OTHER THAN A 
POSSESSOR, VENDOR, OR LESSOR 
Section 
380. Trespassers: special rule 
[Omitted. See §162.] 
381. Trespassers: liability for negligence 
382. Members of possessor's household 
383. Liability of persons acting on behalf of possessor 
384. Liability of persons creating artificial conditions on land on 
behalf of possessor for physical harm caused while work 
remains in their charge 
385. Persons creating artificial conditions on land on behalf of 
possessor: physical harm caused after work has been 
accepted 
386. Persons other than possessor, members of his household, and 
those acting on his behalf who create dangerous condition 
387. Persons taking over entire charge of land 
TOPIC 1. LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS OF LAND TO 
PERSONS ON THE LAND 
TITLE A. DEFINITIONS 
§ 3 2 8 E . Possessor of Land Defined 
A possessor of land is 
(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with 
intent to control it or 
(b) a person who has been in occupation of land with 
intent to control it, if no other person has subsequently 
occupied it with intent to control it, or 
(c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation 
of the land, if no other person is in possession under 
Clauses (a) and (b). 
See Reporter's Notes. 
Comment: 
a. "Possession" has been given various meanings in the 
law, and the term frequently is used to denote the legal rela-
tions resulting from facts, rather than in the sense of describing 
the facts themselves. It is used here strictly in the factual sense, 
because it has been so used in almost all tort cases. 
Pee Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References 
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ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RISK OF ACCIDENT 
Buyer represents that the member fbuysj and member may be the seme person! is covered under the buyer's own insurance policies to cover any pergonal injuries to ..>err perso^'iy 
or which they may cause to others. The buyer and memb& ogret to dea' directs v\itn buyer's own came/ and not the gym on any claim. Buyer acknowledges that the mernbershrp 
cost reflects the savings dut to the fact that the Buyer and Member provide their own insurance and not the Gym ANY PERSON USING THE EQUIPMENT OR THE FACILITIES DOES 
SO AT THEIR OWN RISK it is furtnc agreed that i»l! exercises including the use c>! weights, number of repetition <nd use of any and ail machinery, equipment, and apparatus designed 
for exercising snail be at the Buyer and Member's sote ris,k. NoTw;thste**dtng any consultation on exercise programs which may be provided by Gym employres. it <s hereby understood 
that the ieiectbr of exercise programs, methods and types cf equipment shall be the Buyei or Member's entire iespon«0*tity ana the Gym she!! not bt liable to Buyer or Member 
for any claims, demands, injuries, damages, o' actionc o'smg due to injury to Buyer o« Member, their person, or psoperty prising cut of or m connection with the use by Bu,-er or 
Member of thi- service:, end facilities or the premises where the same tr located and Buyer or Member hereby nonJs the Gym. as employee* and agents harmless from aii claims *h/ch 
may be brought against them by Buyer or Member or or. either of the.r behalf try sve* in,-urie$ of cla'ms aforesaid Buyer and Member shall also examine each piece of equipment 
prior to use and refrain from use and report the same ti there if isny .natation tr.a: the equipment has been subjected to abuse, damaged, or is in ah unsxfci or potentially dangerous 
condition Buv'er and Member has * duty to exercise care *cr tne protection ot himself and other members while using the premises If any accident is caused by e defect o; faulty 
design of the equipment, the injured party vvili direct any claim against the manufacturer, bonding the- Corporation harmless and subrogate their rights, if an\. to the Corporation Buyer 
or Membe; if injured, or Member's representative if Member «s unatic to do so, must complete, sign and del.ver ar\ incident report within seventy two f72i nours ot the time of 
occurrence. As to overexertion stresses and Member's own physical condition an6 any other concerns, or, that the Buyer c Member will seek such advice, c:, that Buyer or Member 
assume the ru.k of proceeding without such advice Buyer and Member represent tnst they have read and agree to abide by tne rules and regulations of the Gym. Bjyer and Member 
agree to lepon any violation cf the rules and regulations t>v other Gym users to employees of the Gym. Notwithstanding the feet that every Gym user has agreed tc abide ny me 
rules and regulations. Buyer und Member recognae that Gym employees cannot monitor every Gym user for & violation of the tutes Gym shall no! be liable to Buve* o* Member foi 
any claims demands, mjyiies, damages, or actions arising due to breach of the Gym rules by other Gym members or users or any conduct of Gym members or users r a-'ure of Buyei 
or Member to comply .vith th>s contract or any rule or regulation snail be cause for revocation of membersh-p without nonce and without tiny liability I or re! und 
i have read the foregoing Assumption o! Risk Clause and understand and agree. I further agree that bv signing below l incorporate personal 
responsibly fo? els contract terms 'inanaai and oihertv/sV'contained in the r/ntroct as r whole including the reverse side of thi^ agreement-
Buyer / Member Signature /{j- A/C( \ , '^rUy<.*^<nr*\_ ir 
Buyer / Member Signature y' ,. £- y / , ' / /fjj„ • •. rj.r1. <.rL sCi^rt^, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
(Subject to change without notice) 
1 Hours* The hours of operation shall be passed on the premises. Hours 13, Violation- Failure by member to comply with this contract or an,- rule 
and days of operations shell be subject to Changs m th* sole discretion or regulation shall be cause for revocation of membership without any 
of the Corporation. notice and without any liability for refund. 
MEMBER PRIVILEGES 
The contract is cancellable upon the following conditions only 
1. Relocation-
EFT; Should a member relocate to a permanent address beyond a 25 m»e 
radius from a fuljy reciprocatfng Gold's Gym, this agreement may be 
canceled PROVIDING: EFT: I The member provides proof of relocation 
acceptable to the gym.tie, powerbitl, lease contract, etc.I 2. All 'monthly 
membership payments are current, 3. The rmmb«r peys e one hundred 
doBsr f 5100.00} canesRetton fee, 4. A 30 dsy written notice is given Jo 
the gym. 
PlF/30-60-90: THERE WILL BE NO REFUND OF PREPAID MEMBERSHIP 
DUES Prepaid memberships are defined as ell memberships in which lull 
payrnem of membership dues i$ ma6e to Gold's Gym in a period of le&s 
than 6 months, including all post-dated payments which will reman 
property of Gold's Gym. Buyer understands that cancellation of the 
contract under the relocation provisions relieves buyer only of his/her 
future obligation of monthly dues and does not entitle buyer to refund of 
prev-ousry paid membership dyes This contract may not he c&ncehd over 
(he phone. 
2 Ttansferring 
A- Membership may not be transferred to another than those under the 
management for Bodyfwm Inc 
5 Transferring a membership to another person may occur when the 
member has found a buyer who wishes tc fulfill the remaining terms ot 
?he contract All payments received by Gcld's Gym will remain property 
of Gold's Gym, There is a transfer fee of one hundred dollars C$100 00; 
payable to Gold's Gym Only full priced memberships may transfer, nc 
family add-on, special price, cornp or trade memberships may transfe' 
3- Changes- The only person who can ma«e ony changes or inquires o-*-
ems contract is the edurt whose name fe on the contract. Otherwise 
Gold's Gym needs written notarized consent. This contract mov not be 
canceled over the phone 
4
 Cancellation- Withm three business days alter signing this contract the 
buyer may return this contract to the corporate office or send certified 
mai5 to Goki's Gym corporate office. A business dsy ts any day of which 
the corporate office is open. Without a written cancellation receipt, no 
canceUatton wiH be effective. All materia* given at the time of sign up 
must b* returned. This contract may not be canceled over the phone 
5- Ceased Operation- In the event this Gold's Gym closes and another 
simitar gym operated by the Seller or its assignees of the Seller of this 
contract is not available within a ten (101 mile redius of the location 
wtiete the member is enroPed, Seller .will refund to member a prorata 
share of the membership cost, based upon the unused membership time 
remaining according to the contract. 
6. Fftx^iofl membership- Buyer mpy Umr* membership fry unv reasoft et 
;; twenty-live dollar fj.25; freezing fee. Fietaes must be lor a 30 6bt 
rmnimum and a maximum of 24 months. Freezing does not exclude 
member from regular payments. Payments due, if any, must be made 
during the freeze period. Freeze time is non-transferable The applicable 
form must be filled out and signed at the Gym locations. Exceptions may 
be made at the discretion of Gold's Gym. 
^ Amenities- Amenities and servicer- vary between clubs and 
memberships. Gold's Gym reserves the right to change or charge for 
specific amenities 
8. Minor- AU buywrroembert that sign the membership agreement, 
assumption of risk, and rules and regulations shaU be assumed to be IB 
years of age or older By signing any of these categories, I incorporate 
responsibility of proof oi legal age 
2 Holidays or closed days, maintenance- The facilities may t»e temporarily 
closed for maintenance purposes. Should the facilities be unavailable for 
members use at any other time, due to damage by fire, act of god. 
catastrophe, accident or other reason, the membefsfnp will be extended 
for a period equal to the time of such unavailability 
3. Membership carda/Sign-in All members upon entering are required to 
provide Barcode with a photo 10 or other current method of 
identification to enter tha gym facilities. Replacement of -ost cards will 
be made upon (a! providing proof of membership, (bl providing picture 
identification, and {cl paying © reasonable fee. Unauthorized use of caroji 
or facilities may subject user and member to civil and/or criminal 
penalties. 
». Lockers- Lockers are provided as a courtesy lor day use only without 
guarantee. Members are requested to bring their own locks. 
Combination locks are preferred, All personal belongings must be placed 
m lockers and not left in dressing room booths, THE CORPORATION IS 
NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR LOST, STOLEN OR DAMAGED ARTICLES. DO 
NOT BRING VALUABLES TO THE PREMISES. 
'- \Travel privileges- Use of all Gold Gyms is avertable but not guaranteed. 
With « travel pass you may u&e reciprtjeating gyms up to 14 days per 
year 
®- Guest phvilfefjes Members must present a valid guest pass isee yaus 
fitness consultant!, All guests must be 18 years of age and under the 
guidance of an instructor. There may be a guest fee attached Guests 
who do not present a valid guest pass or guests who are from out of 
town, will be assessed a ten dollar ISIOj f w {m %&$ 0 f facilities (Guest 
fee may be applied to mentoetship purchase if enrolled th* day the fee •£ 
paid! 
?, Day &*<*• Supervised Eiay Care ts provided only while the member is 
on the gym premises. We are "State Licensed* Management ami stata 
regulations Brrtit Day Care hours and rules. Rate and hours may be 
changed at management's discretion 
8. Cleanliness and Conduct- Sexual harassment will not be tolerated 
Suitable, presentable and dean clothing in good repair i t to be worn by 
membei at member's own expense. In th* exercise area, such would 
inciudfe gym shorts and i-shirrs or sweatsuits fno swimsuiUij for men ar«S 
iaotards oi sweatsuits too iwimsuitsi lot women, together with clean 
tennis shoes Bn6 socks. Negative attitudes, threats, fights, of disruptive 
or threatening conduct will not be tolerated. Outside business solicitation 
wtil not be tolerated in/nt cm the premies. 
9
 pontesy- To promote safety and effective and more time efficient 
exercise programs, remember to return
 ajt plates, dumbbells and barbells 
to designated racis. Ounng high-traffic workout hours, be sure to 
encourage members to *work to* with vou between sets during your tost 
p*r»rt 
'0- EPUI Language- Foul language w«M not be tolerated. 
1
 * Striking Clause- if ony portion of this contract is found to be m 
violation of any laws, it shall be stricken from the contract and shall have 
no affect on the viability of the remaining contract terms including the 
reverse side of this agreement 
1 2
 Other posted rules- Reasonable rules and reguiabana may be posted 
ffom time to time regarding the health, protection, or safety of member;-,, 
end a« Membership Agreements sJhaff be subject to strict compliance 
therewith. Additional rutes for the protection of member and the faciUUei 
may be added et any time 
Buyer and/or Member have read the foregoing and agree to it. 
iifna latuy 
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